fix(admin): 渠道代理 - 校验代理地址并拒绝无效出口

PR: #717
PR 标题: feat(admin): 渠道管理 - 模型供应商支持渠道级 SOCKS5/HTTP 代理

校验渠道级代理地址并在历史无效配置下拒绝出站请求,保留空代理回退全局代理的行为,同时补充管理端和出站层回归测试。

Co-authored-by: ddcat666 <26564566+ddcat666@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
dxiaomandddcat666 authored and ddcat666 committed 2026-10-10 05:44:48 +08:00
1 parent 524d2910ca
commit d13e1dcaa3
9 files changed
+88 -9

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+34 -3
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ const (
maxOutboundRedirects = 5
maxOutboundHeaderCount = 32
maxOutboundHeaderBytes = 16 << 10
maxProxyURLBytes = 512
CustomRelayHeadersHeader = "X-Canvas-Upstream-Headers"
DefaultOutboundUserAgent = "CanvasViewport/1.0 (+https://github.com/ddcat-ai/open-ai-canvas)"
)
@@ -96,6 +97,30 @@ func ValidateCustomRelayURL(rawURL string) (*url.URL, error) {
return parsed, nil
}
// ValidateProxyURL 校验渠道级代理地址。代理可以使用认证信息和私网地址,
// 因为它是管理员配置的出口,而不是用户可控的上游 URL。
func ValidateProxyURL(rawURL string) (*url.URL, error) {
rawURL = strings.TrimSpace(rawURL)
if rawURL == "" {
return nil, nil
}
if len(rawURL) > maxProxyURLBytes {
return nil, BadAuthRequest("渠道代理地址过长")
}
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil || !parsed.IsAbs() || parsed.Hostname() == "" {
return nil, BadAuthRequest("渠道代理地址无效")
}
scheme := strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme)
if scheme != "socks5" && scheme != "socks5h" && scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" {
return nil, BadAuthRequest("渠道代理只支持 socks5/socks5h/http/https")
}
if parsed.Fragment != "" {
return nil, BadAuthRequest("渠道代理地址不允许包含片段")
}
return parsed, nil
}
func OutboundHTTPClient(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
return &http.Client{
Transport: outboundTransport,
@@ -119,7 +144,7 @@ func OutboundHTTPClientWithProxy(timeout time.Duration, proxyURL string) *http.C
}
transport := newOutboundTransportWithProxy(proxyURL)
if transport == nil {
return OutboundHTTPClient(timeout)
return &http.Client{Transport: rejectingTransport{err: errors.New("渠道代理地址无效")}, Timeout: timeout}
}
return &http.Client{
Transport: transport,
@@ -134,6 +159,12 @@ func OutboundHTTPClientWithProxy(timeout time.Duration, proxyURL string) *http.C
}
}
type rejectingTransport struct{ err error }
func (t rejectingTransport) RoundTrip(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return nil, t.err
}
func CustomRelayHTTPClient(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
return &http.Client{
Transport: customRelayTransport,
@@ -315,8 +346,8 @@ func outboundProxyFromEnvironment(req *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {
// 本地 DNS 在 TUN/VPN 模式下会返回 fake-ip,若先本地解析再经代
// 理连接会导致远端拿到不可达的假 IP;交给远端解析可避免此问题。
func newOutboundTransportWithProxy(proxyURL string) *http.Transport {
parsed, err := url.Parse(proxyURL)
if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" {
parsed, err := ValidateProxyURL(proxyURL)
if err != nil || parsed == nil {
return nil
}
scheme := strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme)
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
@@ -46,6 +47,24 @@ func TestConfiguredProxyHostIsTrustedAsDeploymentEgress(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestOutboundHTTPClientWithProxyFailsClosedForInvalidURL(t *testing.T) {
client := OutboundHTTPClientWithProxy(time.Second, "ftp://127.0.0.1:1080")
request, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://example.com", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := client.Do(request); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "渠道代理地址无效") {
t.Fatalf("invalid proxy should fail closed, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestOutboundHTTPClientWithProxyFallsBackForEmptyURL(t *testing.T) {
client := OutboundHTTPClientWithProxy(time.Second, " \t")
if client.Transport != outboundTransport {
t.Fatal("empty proxy URL should use the global outbound transport")
}
}
func TestNormalizeOutboundHeadersAllowsCustomUserAgent(t *testing.T) {
headers, err := NormalizeOutboundHeaders([]OutboundHeader{{Name: "user-agent", Value: "Custom Gateway/2.0"}, {Name: "X-Gateway-Tenant", Value: "tenant-a"}})
if err != nil {